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Abstract. The optimal (‘equilibrium’) macroscopic properties of an economy
with N industries endowed with different technologies, P commodities and one
consumer are derived in the limit N → ∞ with n = N/P fixed using the replica
method. When technologies are strictly inefficient, a phase transition occurs upon
increasing n. For low n, the system is in an expanding phase characterized by
the existence of many profitable opportunities for new technologies. For high n,
technologies roughly saturate the possible productions and the economy becomes
strongly selective with respect to innovations. The phase transition and other
significant features of the model are discussed in detail. When the inefficiency
assumption is relaxed, the economy becomes unstable at high n.
1. Introduction
In recent years it has become increasingly clear that the emergence of non-trivial
collective phenomena in systems of heterogeneous interacting agents (e.g. markets,
information networks, or ecosystems) presents deep analogies with the occurrence of
phase transitions in disordered statistical systems, when heterogeneities in the former
can be mapped onto disorder variables in the latter. The ideas and techniques of
mean-field spin-glass theory [1] play a major role in the current studies of multi-
agent systems. As happened in other interdisciplinary applications of spin-glass theory
from neural networks [2] to computer science [3], the effectiveness of these methods
in economics-inspired problems can go well beyond the purely technical level. Some
issues like the emergence of collective phenomena in evolving populations of competing
agents have already started to be elucidated via spin-glass type of ideas (see e.g. the
literature on the Minority Game [4]). Another intriguing class of problems arising in
economics where such a potential can be fully expressed concerns the characterization
of the equilibria of heterogeneous economies.
In a nutshell, economic equilibria are optimal microscopic states of an economy in
which (a) all economic agents maximize their respective payoffs (firms maximize profits
and consumers maximize utilities) and (b) the prices of goods are such that the total
demand and the total supply of each commodity match exactly [5, 6]. Microscopic
degrees of freedom are typically the scale of production of firms and the level of
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consumption of consumers, while technologies and endowments or utility functions
are heterogeneous across firms and consumers respectively. The central problem
is extracting robust macroeconomic properties and laws that can be tested against
observed patterns of real economies. Heterogeneities complicate things considerably
from a theoretical viewpoint. The traditional approach of economics is based on
the so-called representative agent description, in which each class of economic agents
(firms and consumers) is substituted by a single, “average” agent whose characteristics
are, to a large extent, postulated. An alternative pathway consists in modeling
heterogeneities through randomness [7]. While this approach has drawn heavily from
tools of statistical mechanics, mainly via analogies with random field models [8], the
possibility of systematically employing statistical mechanics to clarify the statistical
structure of economic equilibria has only been partially explored thus far.
In this work, we apply spin-glass techniques to the study of a random production
economy assuming that technologies (i) are random vectors, (ii) are to some degree
inefficient and (iii) can be operated at any (non-negative) scale. Within this
framework, which is standard in economics [9], it is possible to derive an effective-
agent problem whose solution embodies that of the original multi-agent problem.
Key macroeconomic quantities such as averages and distributions of prices, operation
scales and consumptions can be computed exactly. Remarkably, they turn out to
be either directly connected or easily derived from the spin-glass order parameters
that naturally arise in calculations. Consequently, a macroeconomic picture emerges
naturally from microeconomic interactions and the corresponding phase structure can
be fully characterized.
Our emphasis in this paper will be mainly on ‘physical’ properties of the model
(e.g. phase transitions), so we will not analyze the behavior of such quantities as the
gross domestic product of the economy. For a more articulated economic discussion,
we refer the reader to [10], where a slightly simpler model than the one presented
here is studied in a fully economic perspective. The outline of this work is hence
as follows. In Sec. 2 we expound the formal aspects of the multi-agent problem
and outline the spin-glass approach. Two types of economies are considered: those
with strictly inefficient technologies and those whose technologies are inefficient on
average. These two situations give rise to strikingly different macroscopic properties.
The former choice yields a more realistic economic picture and a non-trivial physical
scenario, which is thoroughly analyzed in Sec. 3. In the latter case, the economy
displays simpler but less realistic properties, that are the subject of Sec. 4. Finally, in
Sec. 5, we fomulate our conclusions and discuss some possible directions for further
work.
2. The problem and its solution
2.1. Statement of the problem
The definitions of our model parallel those employed in the theory of economic
equilibria, see e.g. [9]. We consider an economy with N firms or industries and P
commodities. Each industry is endowed with a technology or activity that allows the
transformation of some commodities (“inputs”) into others (“outputs”). Technologies
are denoted as P -dimensional vectors ξi = {ξµi } ∈ RP , where negative (resp. positive)
components represent quantities of inputs (resp. outputs). Furthermore, each firm
can operate its technology at a scale si ≥ 0, meaning that when run at scale si the
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industry i produces or consumes a quantity ξµi si of commodity µ. The profit of firm i is
πi = si(p·ξi), where p = {pµ} is the price vector, which we assume to be non-negative.
Each firm chooses si by solving
max
si≥0
πi (1)
at fixed prices. Produced goods are bought by consumers to satisfy their needs. Here
we consider the case of a single consumer (‘society’) endowed with an initial bundle of
goods y = {yµ}, yµ ≥ 0, and with a prescribed utility function U(x) (‘welfare’). The
consumer selects the desired consumption x = {xµ} by solving
max
x∈B
U(x), B = {x ≥ 0 : p · x ≤ p · y} (2)
at fixed prices. B denotes the consumer’s budget set. We specialize here to the case
of a separable utility:
U(x) =
P∑
µ=1
u(xµ) (3)
which simplifies the analysis considerably. We assume in this way that commodities
are a priori equivalent for the consumer. While our calculations hold in general for
u’s such that u′(x) > 0 and u′′(x) < 0, for numerical calculations we set u(x) = log x.
Equilibria are defined as microscopic configurations (s,x), with s = {si} and
x = {xµ}, that solve (1) and (2) and such that
x = y +
N∑
i=1
siξi (4)
The above “market-clearing” condition ensures that the total demand of each good,
xµ − yµ, matches the total supply ∑i ξµi si.
We concentrate on the limit of large economies, namely N → ∞, P → ∞,
n = N/P fixed. The consumer’s initial endowments yµ are assumed to be sampled
independently from a distribution ρ(y). The complexity of the production processes is
modeled by postulating that technologies ξi are quenched random vectors. In order to
avoid unrealistic features, it is crucial to impose that it is not possible to produce, by
some combination of the available technologies, a positive amount of some commodity
without consuming a positive amount of some other commodity (“impossibility of the
Land of Cockaigne” [9]). We enforce this condition in two ways.
Hard-constrained technologies. The ξµi ’s are taken to be Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and variance ∆i/P satisfying
∀i :
P∑
µ=1
ξµi = −ǫi (5)
The parameters ǫi > 0 measure the inefficiency of the transformation process of
technologies, i.e. the difference between the total quantity of inputs and the total
quantity of outputs.
Soft-constrained technologies. The ξµi ’s are taken to be Gaussian random
variables with mean −ǫi/P and variance ∆i/P .
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These two choices give rise to very different macroscopic properties. In both cases, we
further assume that
ǫi = η
√
∆i (6)
and that ∆i is drawn from a distribution g(∆) independently for each i.
The parameters that ultimately regulate the economy’s equilibria are thus n and
η, together with the functions u(x), ρ(y) and g(∆).
As said above, in this setup commodities are statistically equivalent in all respects.
Hence, this model focuses on the ability of the economy to produce scarce goods using
abundant goods as inputs. Our aim is thus to understand how the global level of
prosperity, measured by the utility of the consumer and by the amount of economic
activity, increases as the repertoire of available technologies expands.
2.2. Statistical mechanics approach
In the following, we shall generally denote by brackets 〈· · ·〉z the average over a random
variable z, irrespective of its distribution.
To begin with, let us observe that the problem of finding the equilibrium of the
economy ultimately takes the form
max
{si≥0}
U
(
y +
N∑
i=1
siξi
)
(7)
This is self-evident from the consumer’s viewpoint. But if (7) is solved, the firms’
profit maximization is solved too. Indeed, taking the partial derivative of U with
respect to si we find
∂U
∂si
=
P∑
µ=1
∂u
∂xµ
ξµi = λ
∂πi
∂si
(8)
where we used the fact that the consumer’s utility maximization, subject to the budget
constraint, implies that ∂U∂xµ = λp
µ for some Lagrange multiplier λ > 0. This is the
content of the first Welfare Theorem [5]: the market achieves an allocation of resources
that is simultaneously optimal for all participants.
Eq. (7) is a standard problem in statistical mechanics, which can be solved by
introducing a fictitious temperature, building a partition function with −U in place of
the Hamiltonian, and then letting the temperature to zero. In order to cope with the
disorder (either hard- or soft-constrained), it is necessary to introduce replicas before
averaging. This standard procedure generates macroscopic order parameters such as
qab =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∆isiasib (9)
where the indices a, b = 1, . . . , r run over replicas. The convexity properties of U
ensure that the solution of the maximization problem is unique. This implies that
the replicated partition function, which in the limit N → ∞ can be computed via a
simple saddle-point integration, is dominated by replica-symmetric saddles where
qa,b = Qδa,b + q(1− δa,b). (10)
(in spin-glass jargon, Q represents the self-overlap while q is the analog of the Edwards-
Anderson order parameter). Here, we will leave routine calculations aside (details of
a very similar calculation can be found in [10]). Let it suffice to say that after taking
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the thermodynamic limit N → ∞, the replica limit r → 0, and the limit of zero
temperature, one arrives at an expression of the form
lim
N→∞
1
P
〈
max
{si≥0}
U
(
y +
N∑
i=1
siξi
)〉
ξ
= extrω f(ω) (11)
where ω is a vector of order parameters and extr means that the solution is provided
by the saddle point of the function f , i.e. by the vector ω∗ that solves the equation
∂f
∂ω = 0. The function f depends in this case on the type of disorder ξ one is
considering.
We shall first focus on the case of hard-constrained technologies, for which a well-
behaved solution exists for all n, as long as η > 0. Such a solution exhibits two regimes,
separated by a phase transition in the limit η → 0. For small values of n, when
few technologies are available, the economy possesses many unexploited productive
opportunities and the introduction of new technologies increases the productivity of
existing ones. For larger values of n, the economy enters a mature phase, where the
productive sector is largely saturated by existing technologies.
In the soft-constrained case, instead, the economy becomes unstable as the
average scale of production diverges for n larger than a critical η-dependent threshold.
We will show explicitly that such an instability is related to the fact that, above this
threshold, it is possible (with probability one) to combine existing technologies in
order to produce outputs without using inputs.
3. Hard-constrained technologies
3.1. The effective-agent problems
If all technologies are strictly inefficient (i.e. if, for each i,
∑
µ ξ
µ
i = −η
√
∆i), one
finds that equilibria are described by the saddle point of
f(Q, γ, χ, χ̂, κ, p) =
1
2
nQχ̂− 1
2
γχ+ κp
+
〈
max
x≥0
[
u(x)− 1
2χ
(
x− y + t
√
nQ+ κ
)2]〉
t,y
+
+n
〈
max
s≥0
[
−1
2
∆χ̂s2 + st
√
∆(γ − p2)− sηp
√
∆
]〉
t,∆
(12)
where t is a unit Gaussian random variable, and averages over y and ∆ are performed
with distributions ρ(y) and g(∆), respectively. The representative-agent problem
embodying the equilibrium structure of the multi-agent economy is rather clear.
The first maximization problem on the r.h.s. can be interpreted as an effective-
utility maximization by the consumer with respect to the consumption of a single
“representative” commodity. The second one corresponds instead to effective-profit
maximization by a “representative” company with respect to its operation scale. The
two problems are interconnected in a non-trivial way by the other terms. The solutions
x∗ ≡ x∗(t, y) and s∗ ≡ s∗(t,∆) of the effective problems as functions of the random
variables (t, y) and (t,∆), respectively, are given by
x∗ ≡ x∗(t, y) such that χu′(x∗) = x∗ − y + t
√
nQ+ κ (13)
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and
s∗(t,∆) =

tσ − ηp
χ̂
√
∆
for t ≥ ηp/σ
0 otherwise
(14)
Notice that the equilibrium consumption x∗ is non-negative as long as u′(x) diverges
when x → 0. Notice also that the dependence of the equilibrium scale s∗ on ∆ is
described by
s∗(t,∆) =
1√
∆
s∗(t, 1) (15)
Moreover, by introducing the re-scaled variable s˜ = s
√
∆ the dependence of (12) on
∆ disappears. This simple scaling will greatly simplify our discussion of the effects
induced by heterogeneities in ∆ (next section).
Using the shorthand σ =
√
γ − p2 and a little algebra, the saddle-point conditions
can be seen to take the following form:
p = 〈u′(x∗)〉t,y (16)
σ =
√[
〈u′(x∗)2〉t,y − 〈u′(x∗)〉2t,y
]
(17)
χ̂ =
1√
nQ
〈tu′(x∗)〉t,y (18)
Q =
〈
(s∗)2∆
〉
t,∆
(19)
χ =
n
σ
〈
ts∗
√
∆
〉
t,∆
(20)
κ = pχ+ nη
〈
s∗
√
∆
〉
t,∆
(21)
In the next sections we shall discuss the generic properties of the above saddle-point
problem and the corresponding phase structure.
3.2. Economic interpretation
The meaning of the macroscopic order parameters and of the saddle-point conditions
can be easily found with at most some basic algebra.
• Equation (16) implies that the order parameter p is the average (relative) price,
while σ (see (17)) measures (relative) price fluctuations. This is so because utility
maximization under budget constraint gives ∂u∂xµ = λp
µ with λ > 0 a Lagrange
multiplier that can be set to 1 without any loss of generality. Evaluating this at
the saddle point gives precisely (16).
• Averaging the expression in (13) over t and y and expressing κ via (21) one finds
〈x∗〉t,y = 〈y〉y − nη
〈
s∗
√
∆
〉
t,∆
(22)
This equation can also be obtained by averaging the market clearing condition
(4) over technologies taking (5) into account. Hence (22) can be seen as the
macroeconomic analog of (4).
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• It is possible to show via elementary manipulations [10] that
〈u′(x∗)(x∗ − y)〉t,y = 0 (23)
Remembering that u′(x∗) is the relative price at equilibrium, this equation implies
that the consumer saturates his/her budget when choosing his/her consumption.
This law, known in economics as Walras’ law [5], is a generic consequence of the
microscopic setup of economic equilibria. The fact that it can be retrieved from
our macroscopic saddle-point problem constitutes a significant consistency check.
3.3. Equilibrium distributions of operation scales, consumptions and (relative) prices
The distribution of operation scales P(s) provides important information, for it can
be seen as a proxy for the distribution of firm sizes (either in terms of revenues or in
terms of the number of employees). Its calculation in our model can be carried out
with the help of (15). In fact, one has
P(s) =
∫ ∞
0
g(∆)P (s|∆)d∆ (24)
where P (s|∆) is the distribution of operation scales at fixed ∆. The latter can be
derived from (14) and from the (Gaussian) distribution of t:
P (s|∆) = 〈δ(s− s∗(t,∆))〉t = (1− φ)δ(s) +
χ̂√
2πσ2
e−
(χ̂s
√
∆+ηp)2
2σ2 θ(s) (25)
with
φ =
〈
θ
(
t− ηp
σ
)〉
t
=
1
2
[
1− erf
(
ηp
σ
√
2
)]
(26)
the fraction of active firms (i.e. firms such that si > 0), which is independent of ∆.
Now (15) implies that P (s|∆) =
√
∆P (s
√
∆|1) so that
P(s) = 2
s3
∫ ∞
0
k2g
(
k2
s2
)
P (k|1)dk (27)
where we simply set k = s
√
∆. The behavior of Q(s) for large s is related to
the behavior of g(∆) for small ∆. In particular, if g(∆) ∝ ∆γ for ∆ ≪ 1, then
P(s) ∝ s−3−2γ for s≫ 1, which agrees with the power law behavior found empirically
for the distribution of firm sizes [11, 12].
The distribution of equilibrium consumptions at fixed endowments can be
computed from (13) via the distribution of t. One gets
P (x|y) = 〈δ(x− x∗(t, y))〉t =
1− χu′′(x)√
2πnQ
e−
(x−y−χu′(x)+κ)2
2nQ (28)
As before, the equilibrium distribution of consumptions is given by
P(x) =
∫ ∞
0
ρ(y)P (x|y)dy (29)
Likewise, it is also possible to compute, via the simple change of variable
p = u′(x), the equilibrium distribution of prices.
Statistical mechanics analysis of the equilibria of linear economies 8
3.4. Limit ρ(y)→ δ(y − y)
If the spread of initial endowments becomes vanishingly small, the amount of
productive activity is expected, quite intuitively, to vanish too. In order to see this,
one can proceed as follows. Let the initial endowment be expressed as
y = y + ζ (30)
with ζ a (small) r.v. with zero average and y a positive number, and let
x∗(t, y) ≡ y + ψ ψ ≡ ψ(t, ζ) (31)
Anticipating that ψ ∼ ζ will be a small quantity when 〈ζ2〉
ζ
≪ 1, we can write to
leading order
u′(x∗) ≃ u′(y) + ψu′′(y). (32)
Likewise,
p ≃ u′(y) + u′′(y) 〈ψ〉t,ζ (33)
χ̂ ≃ u
′′(y)√
nQ
〈tψ〉t,ζ (34)
σ2 ≃ [u′′(y)]2
(〈
ψ2
〉
t,ζ
− 〈ψ〉2t,ζ
)
(35)
follow immediately from (16), (17) and (18). An expression for ψ can be obtained
from (13) via (32):
χ[u′(y) + ψu′′(y)] ≃ κ+ ψ − ζ + t
√
nQ (36)
Separating terms of order ψ0 from those proportional to ψ, one has
κ = χu′(y) (37)
ψ(t, ζ) =
ζ − t√nQ
1− χu′′(y) (38)
Substituting (38) into (33), (34) and (35) and carrying out the averages one gets
p ≃ u′(y) (39)
χ̂ ≃ − u
′′(y)
1− χu′′(y) (40)
σ2 ≃ χ̂2
(〈
ζ2
〉
ζ
+ nQ
)
(41)
In order to calculateQ, we can use (41). Insertion into (14) yields s∗ = (t−τ)s0θ(t−τ),
where
s0 =
σ
χ̂
√
∆
≃
√
〈ζ2〉ζ + nQ
∆
(42)
τ =
ηp
σ
≃ ηp
χ̂
1√
〈ζ2〉ζ + nQ
(43)
In turn, from (19) we obtain
Q ≃
(〈
ζ2
〉
ζ
+ nQ
)
F (τ) ⇒ Q ≃
〈
ζ2
〉
ζ
F (τ)
1− nF (τ) (44)
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where
F (τ) =
〈
(t− τ)2θ(t− τ)〉
t
(45)
Now (44) and (45) together imply that τ ∼ − 〈ζ2〉−1/2
ζ
for small
〈
ζ2
〉
ζ
so that, when〈
ζ2
〉
ζ
→ 0, one can resort to an asymptotic expansion of F (τ) for τ ≫ 1 to calculate
Q. This gives
Q ≃ 〈ζ2〉3/2
ζ
exp
[
− η
2[u′(y)]2
2[u′′(y)]2 〈ζ2〉ζ
]
(46)
So Q → 0 for 〈ζ2〉
ζ
→ 0 with an essential singularity. In turn, by virtue of (41) and
(26), respectively, σ → 0 and φ → 0 for 〈ζ2〉
ζ
→ 0. Hence when the spread of initial
endowments decreases, economic activity vanishes very rapidly and no market activity
takes place when initial endowments are all equal.
3.5. Limit η → 0: the phase transition
Before discussing the actual solutions of the saddle-point equations as a function of
n and the corresponding economic picture, let us briefly investigate the limit η → 0
of marginally efficient technologies, in which the critical properties of the model can
be elucidated in detail. When η = 0, one sees from (26) that the fraction of active
companies becomes φ = 1/2, while from (14) one gets
s∗(t,∆) =

tσ
χ̂
√
∆
for t ≥ 0
0 for t ≤ 0
(47)
The saddle-point conditions (19), (20) and (21) in turn take the simple form
Q =
σ2
2χ̂2
χ =
n
2χ̂
κ = pχ (48)
One sees immediately that this provides a solution that must break down for n > 2,
as there cannot be more than P active firms in the economy (i.e. φ must satisfy the
condition nφ ≤ 1). Let us then focus on the limit n → 2− by studying the case
0 < 2 − n ≪ 1. When there is an almost complete set of technologies (i.e. when
nφ ≃ 1), goods can be transformed in almost all ways. Hence we expect that in
equilibrium x∗ = y + ψ with ψ ≡ ψ(t) small. Then we can again use (32) and (13) to
obtain an expression for ψ (as done in (36)). After simple algebra we find
ψ =
2χ̂(y − y) + tσ√2n
nu′′(y)− 2χ̂ (49)
Substituting this into (40) and (41) one obtains
χ̂ = −1
2
u′′(y)(2− n) (50)
σ2 =
1
2
[u′′(y)]2(2 − n) (51)
and thus, while the fluctuation of relative prices σ → 0, because of (48), Q ∼ 12−n
and χ ∼ 12−n . This means that the typical scale of production diverges as 1√2−n when
n→ 2−.
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A slightly more refined analysis is required to investigate the limit η → 0 for
n > 2. To simplify equations, for the remainder of this section we fix ∆ = 1 and resort
to the notation introduced in the previous section, so that s∗ = (t− τ)s0θ(t− τ) with
s0 and τ as defined in the equalities in (42) and (43). Again anticipating that, because
the set of technologies is almost complete and efficient, the equilibrium consumption
levels x∗ = y + ψ will fluctuate very little around the average y (i.e. ψ ≪ 1), we can
look for solutions of the saddle-point problem such that σ vanishes linearly with η (i.e.
such that σ ∼ cη) and with s0 = σ/χ̂ finite (i.e. such that χ̂ vanishes linearly with
η as well). In doing so, we will retain only the leading terms in η for the rest of this
section. Now τ = p/c, so that from (19) we have
Q = s20F (p/c) (52)
with F (·) as in (45), whereas from (20) one gets
χ =
ns0
cη
H(p/c) H(x) =
1
2
[
1− erf
(
x√
2
)]
(53)
Expanding (13) as in (32), and using (52) and (53), one obtains
ψ ≃ cη
n|u′′(y)|H(p/c)
[
1
s0
(y − y)− t
√
nF (p/c)
]
(54)
Inserting the above and (52) into (18) one finds
n2H(p/c)2 ≃ 1 (55)
This, via (26), confirms that H(p/c) ≡ φ ≃ 1/n (i.e. that technologies saturate the
possible productions). Moreover, as H(x) < 1/2 for x > 0, it allows us to conclude
that this solution holds for n > 2. Finally, it tells us that c → ∞ for n → 2+ as
c ∼ 1n−2 .
It remains to evaluate s0. To this aim, we use (17). After minor algebraic
manipulations, it yields
s0 ∼ 1√
1− nF (p/c) (56)
For n → 2+ one has c → ∞ and hence F (p/c) → 1/2. So the typical scale of
production (which is proportional to s0) diverges as
1√
n−2 for n→ 2+.
In summary, we found that for η → 0 a critical value nc = 2 of n exists such that
φ =
{
1/2 for n < nc
1/n for n > nc
(57)
while the typical scale of operations behaves as
〈s∗〉 ∼ 1√|n− nc| |n− nc| ≪ 1 (58)
This shows that the behavior of the economy close n = 2 for η ≪ 1 is totally analogous
to that of a second-order phase transition in statistical physics.
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Figure 1. Phase diagram. Critical lines nc(η) for the economy with hard-
constrained technologies (solid line) and soft-constrained technologies (dashed
line). The economies are unstable for n > nc(η).
3.6. Transition to the Land of Cockaigne
The analysis performed so far can be easily extended to negative values of η. In this
case, it is to be expected that the economy becomes unstable at certain critical points
nc(η). The reason is that, for each fixed η < 0, combinations of technologies allowing
to produce all goods without absorbing inputs (i.e. such that
∑
i siξ
µ
i > 0 for all µ)
become possible with probability one when n is sufficiently large, larger than a critical
η-dependent value nc(η). The equilibrium is stable for n < nc(η), whereas equilibrium
operation scales diverge as n → nc(η). Once this has happened, initial endowments
become irrelevant, so that nc(η) is independent of ρ(y). Rather, it only depends on
the asymptotic behavior of the utility function u(x). Fig. 1 shows the critical line
nc(η) (solid line) separating the stable from the unstable phase for u(x) = log x and
g(∆) = δ(∆ − 1). This line was obtained by imposing the condition nφ = 1 on the
solution of the saddle point equations with s0 → ∞. As η decreases, nc(η) rapidly
approaches 1, with an exponential behavior.
Notice that while this transition is continuous and characterized by divergences
(i.e. si → ∞) for η ≤ 0 as n → nc(η), it is discontinuous across the η = 0 line for
n > 2. Indeed all scales of consumption 〈x∗〉 and production 〈s∗〉 remain finite as
η → 0+ for n > 2 and diverge abruptly as soon as η < 0. This makes the phase
diagram of this model very similar to that of Minority Games with market-impact
correction [13]. Broadly speaking, both models deal with a system where a number N
of agents compete for the exploitation of a fixed number P of resources and in both
cases η tunes the efficiency of agent’s behavior.
3.7. Solution in a typical example
Let us finally discuss the solutions of the saddle-point problem as a function of n. We
have chosen, for simplicity, the following parameters:
g(∆) = δ(∆− 1) u(x) = log x ρ(y) = e−y (59)
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Figure 2. Economy with hard-constrained technologies. Behaviour of nφ (φ =
fraction of active companies) at equilibrium as a function of n for η = 0.05 and
g(∆) = δ(∆ − 1): analytical prediction (continuous line), computer experiments
with P = 16 (dotted line) and for P = 32 (dashed line) averaged over 100 disorder
samples. Dots represent results of a single realization of the technologies. Inset:
φ vs n for η = 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5 (top to bottom)
Correspondingly, we have obtained numerically the solution of Eq.s (16–21) as a
function of n for different values of η. The resulting economic observables, representing
equilibrium values, have been compared to those of equilibria computed numerically
via a simple gradient descent algorithm for a toy economy with P = 16 and P = 32
commodities.
The fraction of active firms φ (or nφ) is shown in Fig. 2. The two regimes
described by (57) appear distinctly for low η. For n < nc = 2, φ is roughly equal
to 1/2. Here, about a half of the existing technologies are profitable. For n > nc,
instead, φ ≃ 1/n, i.e. the number of active firms saturates the number of goods and
the economy becomes extremely selective. This picture persists for larger values of η,
although the transition appears to be more and more blurred as η increases.
In Fig. 3 we display the equilibrium behaviour of some economically relevant
quantities. Let us discuss the behavior for n < nc = 2 first. One sees that the average
scale of production increases when n grows. This can be interpreted by saying that
all firms benefit from the introduction of new technologies (i.e. from an increase of
n) if the market is not too selective. In parallel, relative price fluctuations decrease
as n increases, as does the average level of consumption, signalling that firms are
managing the transformation of abundant goods into scarce ones. The distribution of
consumptions preserves the character of the original distribution of endowments for
low n [10], while relative fluctuations stay roughly unchanged.
When n is close to nc, operation scales become larger and larger as η decreases
(i.e. as technologies become more and more efficient) and ultimately develop a
singularity at nc in the marginally efficient limit η → 0 (see (58)). The fluctuations
of relative consumptions start to drop (the sharper the lower is η), as the distribution
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Figure 3. Economy with hard-constrained technologies. Behaviour of some
relevant economic observables at equilibrium with g(∆) = δ(∆−1). Top left panel:
average scale of operation. Bottom left panel: relative price fluctuations. Top
right panel: average consumption level. Bottom right panel: relative fluctuations
of the consumption level. Values of η are as indicated.
of consumptions becomes more and more peaked around the mean value. Identifying
abundant (or scarce) goods becomes increasingly hard.
In the saturated regime n > nc, technological innovations (N → N +1) lead to a
decrease in the average operation scale, i.e. new profitable technologies punish existing
ones. Firms cannot take advantage of the spread between scarce and abundant goods
any longer, and technologies are subject to a much stronger selection. On the other
hand, the average consumption starts growing with n, as is expected in a competitive
economy that selects highly efficient technologies.
It is interesting to notice (see [10] for a more detailed economic discussion) that
while technological innovations (i.e. increases of N at fixed P ) improve the global
economic picture for n < nc, when n > nc a global improvement requires broadening
the range of disposable commodities (i.e. an increase of P at fixed N , or a decrease
of n). Within the obvious limitations of this model, this seems to suggest that
an economy driven by technological innovation and products creation may evolve
‘spontaneously’ toward the critical point nc under its agents’ maximizing pressures.
4. Soft-constrained technologies
4.1. The effective-agent problem and its typical solutions
Let us now turn our attention to the case of soft-constrained technologies. The analog
of (12) in this case is
f(Q, γ, χ, χ̂,m, m̂) =
1
2
nQχ̂− 1
2
γχ− nmm̂ (60)
+n
〈
max
s≥0
[
−1
2
∆χ̂s2 + (m̂+ t
√
γ) s
√
∆
]〉
t,∆
+
〈
max
x≥0
[
u(x)− 1
2χ
(
x− y + t
√
nQ+ ηnm
)2]〉
t,y
(61)
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Figure 4. Economy with soft-constrained technologies. Solution of the saddle-
point equations as a function of n for η = 1 and g(∆) = δ(∆ − 1). Left panel:
average scale of operation m and self-overlap Q. Right panel: fraction of active
companies. The dashed vertical lines mark the position of the critical point nc
calculated analytically.
where we used the same notation for averages and variables as in Sec. 3. The effective
problems for firms and consumers are easily identifiable and can be analyzed along
the lines followed in Sec. 3.1. We jump straight to the saddle-point equations, which,
using the same notation as in Sec. 3, now read
m =
〈
s∗
√
∆
〉
t,∆
(62)
Q =
〈
(s∗)2∆
〉
t,∆
(63)
χ =
n√
γ
〈
ts∗
√
∆
〉
t,∆
(64)
γ =
〈
u′(x∗)2
〉
t,y
(65)
m̂ = −η 〈u′(x∗)〉t,y (66)
χ̂ =
1√
nQ
〈tu′(x∗)〉t,y (67)
It is clear that m represents the average scale of operations while m̂ is connected to
the average (relative) price and γ is related to price fluctuations. The above equations
can again be solved numerically upon varying n. Adopting the same choices as in (59),
one obtains the behaviour shown in Fig. 4. Strikingly different macroscopic properties
emerge from this model. In particular, the average scale of operations diverges at a
critical point that for η = 1 is roughly nc ≃ 2.1. It is clear that such an economy is
completely unrealistic. When m diverges, the average relative price drops to zero, so
that arbitrarily large consumptions can be achieved (the reader can verify that relative
price fluctuations are nevertheless finite above nc). We will show in the next section
that this behaviour is due to the fact that for n > nc technologies can be combined in
such a way that
∑
i siξ
µ
i > 0 for all µ, i.e. that it is possible to produce every good
without consuming.
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4.2. The critical point
We will now proceed by calculating the typical volume of configuration space where
technologies can be combined to yield
∑
i siξ
µ
i > 0 for all µ. For a fixed disorder
realization ξ, this volume is given by
V (ξ) =
∫ P∏
µ=1
θ
(
N∑
i=1
siξ
µ
i
)
ds (68)
For n < nc, it is to be expected that V (ξ) is non-zero only with an exponentially small
(in N) probability, whereas the probability of it being finite becomes of order 1 at nc.
The typical volume is obtained from the quenched average of V (ξ):
Vtyp = exp 〈logV (ξ)〉ξ (69)
We will focus in particular on the quantity
S = lim
N→∞
1
N
logVtyp (70)
(analogous to a zero-temperature entropy in statistical physics). From the above
discussion, we expect S to be negative for n < nc and positive for n > nc, so that the
critical point nc can be determined from the condition S = 0.
In principle, nc depends on η and g(∆). Notice, however, that because of the
statistics of the ξµi ’s, a re-scaling si → si
√
∆i makes the integral independent of ∆i’s,
apart from a trivial factor
∏
i
1√
∆i
. Hence we shall set ∆i = 1 for all i without any
loss of generality.
In order to ensure that integrals are well-defined, we introduce a spherical
constraint of the form
∑
i s
2
i = N and concentrate on
V (ξ) =
∫
ei
∑
µ x̂
µ(xµ−∑ i siξµi )− 12 ŷ(∑ i s2i−N)dsdxdx̂dŷ (71)
As before, the evaluation of the ξ-average requires replication techniques. The
calculation is standard and we don’t detail it here. In the limit N →∞ it ultimately
turns out that S is given by the saddle-point value of
h(q,m, m̂, r, y) =
1
2
qr −mm̂+ 1
2
y2 − 1
n
log 2 (72)
+
1
2
log
π
2(y + r)
+
1
n
〈
log
[
1− erf
(
ηnm+ t
√
nq√
2n(1− q)
)]〉
t
(73)
+
m̂2 + r
2(y + r)
+
〈
log
[
1 + erf
(
m̂+ t
√
r√
2(y + r)
)]〉
t
(74)
nc can be found by solving simultaneously the saddle-point equations
∂h
∂q = · · · =
∂h
∂y = 0 with n = nc together with the condition that h vanishes for n = nc. This leads
to the critical line nc(η) shown in Fig. 1 (dashed line) for both positive and negative
values of η. The numerical value obtained for η = 1, namely nc = 2.11524 . . ., is in
convincing agreement with the results of the previous section. We remark that nc → 1
as η → 0. Indeed, when n ≥ 1 there are enough random vectors ξi to span the entire
P -dimensional space. On the other hand, nc ∼ η2 for η ≫ 1.
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5. Conclusions
The model we analyzed here is clearly unrealistic in many respects. However it shows
that tools of statistical physics of disordered systems allow us to characterize the
collective statistical properties of a complex economy, beyond what na¨ıve intuition
and simple probabilistic arguments would suggest. It is reasonably easy to anticipate
a change of behavior for n ≈ 2 on the basis of simple geometric arguments [10]. It is
hard however to generalize these insights to derive, for example, the full picture of the
phase transition for η → 0 we have described, or the behavior of the economy in the
two phases.
It would be desirable to extend this approach to the case with many consumers
or to analyze the effects induced by imperfect competition (oligopolies, see e.g. [5]). A
further extension to time dependent economies may provide interesting insights into
economic growth theory. In particular, one can think about technological improvement
as a dynamics of the ξµi ’s occurring on time scales much longer than those over
which agents achieve equilibrium. This would require a theory just moderately more
sophisticated than the one presented here.
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